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In 2018, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed S.B. 3348, the 
Accountable Capitalism Act. This Act seeks to alter corporate behavior 
to balance the effects of corporate actions across several different 
stakeholder groups, rather than focusing on the primacy of 
shareholders as is conventional in many U.S. state corporate laws. It 
has traditionally been difficult to determine the effects of the law in 
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enabling experimental evaluations of laws through participatory 
simulation. We implemented such a simulation to compare the effects of 
the Accountable Capitalism Act vs. Delaware corporate law on director 
behavior.  
 
We deployed this simulation to 300 human participants via Amazon’s 
crowdsourcing platform. Building on previous findings that showed that 
participants assigned to act as shareholder-selected directors and 
instructed via the Accountable Capitalism Act favored shareholders 
over other stakeholders in forced-choice contexts, this study found that 
such participants instructed via Delaware corporate law favored 
shareholders over other stakeholders as well. However, in a context 
where the alternate option was one that provided balanced benefits for 
several stakeholder groups, those instructed via Delaware corporate 
law placed significantly greater emphasis on shareholders than did 
those instructed via the Accountable Capitalism Act.  
 
Based on the results from the human participants, we constituted 3000 
“virtual boards of directors,” composed of randomly selected groups of 
study participants assigned to different types of directorships. Results 
from the virtual boards of directors suggest that boards composed of 
shareholder-selected directors instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act led to lower levels of disparity across different 
stakeholder groups than those composed of shareholder-selected 
directors instructed via Delaware corporate law. In addition, those 
composed of 60% shareholder-selected directors and 40% employee-
selected directors, as specified in the Accountable Capitalism Act, led 
to still lower levels of disparity than those composed solely of 
shareholder-selected directors.  
 
While these findings are based on interactive simulations rather than 
the real world, and based on the behavior of everyday people rather 
than business executives, they nevertheless provide experimental 
evidence that two key aspects of the Accountable Capitalism Act—the 
requirement for directors to consider the effects of corporate actions on 
various stakeholder groups, and the representation of employees on 
corporate boards—both produce results in line with their desired 
effects. Taken together, these results provide experimental support for 
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the proposition that the Accountable Capitalism Act would lead to more 
balanced corporate behavior than does Delaware corporate law. 
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I. Introduction10  
 
“Scholars, lawyers, judges, and policy-makers frequently need to 
compare corporate laws.”11 Over the past two decades, the field of 
empirical legal studies has explored a range of novel empirical 
approaches to understanding the law. One promising technique in this 
field is the concept of participatory simulation. Originally arising from 





10 Portions of this paper are adapted from an earlier conference publication. See generally B. 
Tomlinson et al., A Participatory Simulation of the Accountable Capitalism Act, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
(2020), available at https://www.ics.uci.edu/~wmt/ACA_CHI.html. The instant Article is a 
full-length scholarly treatment that includes significant novel results. 
11 Lynn M. LoPucki, A Rule-Based Method for Comparing Corporate Laws, OXFORD L. FAC.: 
OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2018/03/rule-based-method-comparing-corporate-laws [https://perma.cc/36FC-
H655]. 
12 See, e.g., Uri Wilensky & Walter Stroup, Learning Through Participatory Simulations: 
Network-Based Design for Systems Learning in Classrooms, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORT FOR COLLABORATIVE LEARNING 667 (Christopher M. 
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brought to bear on legal questions, such as the efficacy of patent 
systems.13 
 
In this article, we use a novel participatory simulation to compare two 
legal frameworks: one that is currently in place, and a second that has 
been proposed as a complement to the first. Specifically, this paper 
examines the effects of elements of Delaware corporate law, the 
dominant legal framework for corporations in the United States, and 
compares them to the effects of analogous elements of the Accountable 
Capitalism Act,14 a piece of legislation proposed in the U.S. Congress. 
 
The goal of the Accountable Capitalism Act, according to a press release 
by the proposer of the act, Senator Elizabeth Warren, is to produce 
“broad-based growth that help[s] workers and shareholders alike.”15 We 
examine two provisions of this act in particular: the first “obligates 
company directors to consider the interests of all corporate 
stakeholders,” and the second specifies that “boards of United States 
corporations must include substantial employee participation.”16 
 
We compare these two provisions with the most common state-based 
legal framework for corporations in the United States, Delaware 
corporate law. The analogous provisions in Delaware law are both 
focused on shareholders,17 providing shareholders with the right to elect 





Hoadley & Jeremy Roschelle eds.), available at 
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.5555/1150240.1150320. 
13 See generally Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patent Expertise and the Regress of 
Useful Arts, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 239 (2009). 
14 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 




17 We here conflate shareholders and stockholders for simplicity, despite some ambiguity over 
whether a distinction exists between the two terms. See Gordon Smith, Shareholder v. 
Stockholder: The Delaware Canard, THE CONGLOMERATE (May 23, 2006), 
https://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/05/shareholder_v_s.html [https://perma.cc/G4LU-
FDS2]. 
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214. 
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best interests of the corporation”19 (and hence typically in the best 
financial interest of the shareholders). 
 
This article presents results from a computational business simulation 
in which human participants play the role of directors of fictional 
corporations. After a brief introduction to the relevant law and their role 
in it and a tutorial about how the simulation works, participants are 
tasked with making decisions on behalf of the corporation they direct. 
After completing a set of twelve decisions, interleaved with several 
second-long periods during which the simulation unfolds based on the 
decisions they took, participants are then asked to answer a few 
questions about their experience. Throughout the process, the 
computational system collects data about the choices they made and 
what they wrote in response to the end-game questions. 
 
The study team used the Amazon Mechanical Turk20 online 
crowdsourcing platform (“AMT”) to launch the study with 300 
participants—100 assigned as shareholder-selected directors instructed 
via Delaware corporate law, 100 assigned as shareholder-selected 
directors instructed via the Accountable Capitalism Act, and 100 
assigned as employee-selected directors instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act. 
 
The core findings from this study fall into three main groups. First, the 
study produced findings about whether participants assigned as 
shareholder-selected directors under different legal frameworks tended 
to favor the shareholders over other stakeholder groups when forced to 
choose. Just as previously published results from this study showed that 
participants assigned as shareholder-selected directors and instructed 
via the Accountable Capitalism Act significantly favored shareholders 
over other stakeholder groups, so too did such participants instructed via 





19 The Delaware Way: Deference to the Business Judgment of Directors Who Act Loyally and 
Carefully, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delaware-way-business-
judgment/[https://perma.cc/2TX8-ZWPR]. 
20 This system’s name is problematic. See Ayhan Aytes, Return of the Crowds: Mechanical 
Turk and Neoliberal States of Exception, in DIGITAL LABOR 79 (Trebor Scholz ed., 2012). For 
clarity, we include the full name here, but use AMT in the remainder of the article. 
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groups (61.3%, p=0.0021*21). The fact that they exhibited this 
favoritism is unsurprising, since participants were (1) told that the 
shareholders selected them, and (2) explicitly instructed that they owed 
a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. However, the fact that the effect 
was statistically indistinguishable from the effect seen under the 
Accountable Capitalism Act, rather than significantly greater, was 
unexpected. 
 
Second, the study produced findings about the effect of different legal 
frameworks on the behavior of participants assigned as shareholder-
selected directors regarding whether they favored balanced choices 
(e.g., where each of three stakeholder groups benefited equally from a 
particular decision) or polarized choices (e.g., where the decision 
produced benefit exclusively for one stakeholder group). The study 
found that, as was previously found regarding shareholder-selected 
directors under the Accountable Capitalism Act,22 shareholder-selected 
directors under Delaware corporate law strongly disfavored polarized 
choices favoring employees (15.0%, p<0.000001**) or the environment 
(14.0%, p<0.000001**) when offered a balanced alternative. However, 
unlike shareholder-selected directors under the Accountable Capitalism 
Act, shareholder-selected directors under Delaware corporate law 
exhibited only a weak disfavoring of shareholders (43.0%, p=0.18) 
when offered a balanced alternative. Their degree of favoring of 
shareholders was significantly greater than their preference for 
employees (p=0.000027**) or the environment (p=0.000012**), and 
significantly greater than the preference for shareholders exhibited by 
shareholder-selected directors acting under the Accountable Capitalism 
Act (p=0.0032*). While it is unsurprising that participants acting as 
shareholder-selected directors under Delaware corporate law would 
favor shareholders more so than employees or the environment, it was 





21 All p-values for results relating to a single observed proportion (e.g., the degree to which 
participants instructed via Delaware corporate law favor shareholders) were calculated using a 
one-proportion Z-test. All p-values for results comparing across two observed proportions 
(e.g., favoring of shareholders vs. favoring of employees) were calculated using a two-tailed, 
two-proportion z-test. The p-value used for a statistically significant result (*) was set as 0.05, 
and highly significant (**) at 0.001. 
22 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
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favored balanced choices rather than opting for choices that strongly 
favored shareholders. 
 
Third, the study produced results about how much differently-composed 
boards benefit different stakeholder groups relative to each other. Based 
on 3000 “virtual boards of directors” that were created using randomly-
selected participants of particular types, the study found that boards 
composed solely of shareholder-selected directors under Delaware 
corporate law produced the greatest disparity in outcomes for different 
stakeholder groups, followed by exclusively shareholder-selected 
boards under the Accountable Capitalism Act, followed by the 
60%/40% split (the ratio proposed by the text of the Accountable 
Capitalism Act), which produced the most balanced outcomes. 
 
In sum, while participants acting as shareholder-selected directors 
instructed via both legal frameworks favored their own stakeholder 
groups in forced-choice contexts, shareholder-selected directors acting 
under Delaware corporate law exhibited a much more significant bias 
toward shareholders when given the opportunity to choose a balanced 
approach than did directors under the Accountable Capitalism Act. 
These biases led to virtual boards under Delaware law taking actions 
that had the greatest disparity among outcomes for different stakeholder 
groups, and boards with both shareholder and employee representation 
under the Accountable Capitalism Act producing the most balanced 
outcomes.  
 
The authors recognize that there are numerous reasons why these 
findings may be different from real-world contexts. Most prominently, 
AMT workers are not CEOs, and a simple business simulation is not the 
real world. Nevertheless, this study provides an example of how 
researchers can examine critical questions about representation on 
corporate boards experimentally, and the results from the study offer 
experimental evidence that both the requirement for employee 
representation and requirement to seek balance in the Accountable 
Capitalism Act have concrete effects on the behavior of participants 
acting as corporate directors. The process used here could provide a 
useful and efficient mechanism for understanding the impacts of 
proposed laws. 




This study makes two main contributions to legal scholarship. First, it 
presents the first experimental comparison of Delaware corporate law 
and the Accountable Capitalism Act. Second, it offers a demonstration 
of the potential value of participatory simulations in empirical legal 
studies, providing a new method through which citizens may explore 
law by making decisions with legal and societal consequences, but 
doing so without doing actual harm to society.  
 
While not every question can be answered with data, many can; the 
authors hope that efforts that, at least in part, pursue data-driven 
scholarship around the law could help legal systems more directly 
reflect the desires of the communities that they serve than do approaches 
that are less data-rich. These results provide significant experimental 
support that the Accountable Capitalism Act would likely lead to more 




II. Introduction to Delaware Corporate Law 
 
A. Why Do We Examine Delaware Corporate Law? 
 
Corporate law in general governs the relationships among shareholders, 
boards of directors, creditors, and managers of corporations. Each 
state’s corporate law dictates different incorporation processes and has 
different implications for the fundamental nature of corporations based 
in that state.23 Therefore, the relationship between shareholders and 
directors largely depends on the state of incorporation. In the United 
States, more than two-thirds of Fortune 500 companies choose to 





23 See generally Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s 
Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57 (2009). 
24 Brett Melson, 200,000 New Delaware Companies in 2017, DELAWAREINC (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/new-delaware-companies-2017/ [https://perma.cc/X6M5-
UFFT]. 
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statutes in Delaware are amended quickly to reflect current affairs.25 
Additionally, the well-developed body of case law in Delaware makes 
the rights and obligations of an entity more predictable.26 Therefore, this 
article examines Delaware corporate law as representative of the current 
American corporate law model. 
 
B. How Do Shareholders Vote Under Delaware Corporate 
Law? 
 
In general, when a shareholder purchases common stock in a company, 
the stock comes with voting rights and the benefit of fiduciary duties.27 
Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”) § 212(a) states that, unless 
otherwise provided in the charter, the default rule is one vote for each 
share of capital stock.28 However, most scholars believe that American 
shareholders’ control over the company is substantially limited to voting 
in or out the board of directors, although they do have the right to amend 
the charter or bylaws and, in theory, vote on any material changes in the 
nature of the company.29 This is largely due to the impracticality of 
dispersed shareholders monitoring the board’s behavior.30 Investors 
manage their risk through diversification.31 Therefore, when a 
shareholder is unsatisfied with a company’s performance, most 
shareholders would rather just sell their stock than exercise their voting 
rights.32 This issue of voting is further complicated by the existence of 





25 Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
965, 973 (1995). 
26 Id. at 977. 
27 See Steven E. Bochner & Amy L. Simmerman, The Venture Capital Board Member’s 
Survival Guide: Handling Conflicts Effectively While Wearing Two Hats, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1, 27 (2016). 
28 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212. 
29 See Christopher John Gulinello, The Revision of Taiwan’s Company Law: The Struggle 
Toward a Shareholder-Oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 75, 93 
(2003). 
30 Id.  
31 See Portia Policastro, When Delaware Corporate Managers Turn Auctioneers: Triggering 
the Revlon Duty After the Paramount Decision, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 187, 240 (1991).  
32 See Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing 
Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 43, 45 (1998). 
33 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151. 
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to issue different classes of stock with different voting powers—having 
voting powers dependent on facts ascertainable outside the charter.34  
 
Shareholders can remove board members through the proxy process.35 
Although the proxy process reduces the costs of voting, it reinforces the 
coordination problem because shareholders rarely meet in the same 
room.36 Proxy rules and processes generally advantage the incumbent 
board because the board has access to the company’s finances.37 
Nowadays, shareholders seek to strengthen their control through 
institutional proxy voting advisors like Institutional Shareholder 
Services (“ISS”).38 These services advise shareholders on how they 
should vote on a particular matter and flag governance issues of 
particular concern.39 ISS is influential globally,40 and a huge number of 
institutional investors subscribe.41 The ISS enables investors to 
collectively share information so they can vote as a bloc.42 
 
Under current Delaware corporate law, some mechanisms exist to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders. For example, DGCL § 
141(d) allows minority owners of a certain class of stock “to elect one 
or more directors with such term and voting powers . . . which may be 
greater or less than those of other directors.”43 DGCL § 214 allows a 
company to establish cumulative voting under the charter to protect 
minority shareholders.44 Under cumulative voting, a company can have 
a total number of votes distributed by shareholders as they see fit.45 This 





34 Id.  
35 See J. Travis Laster, Michelle D. Morris, How to Avoid a Collision Between the Delaware 
Annual Meeting Requirement and the Federal Proxy Rules, 10 DEL. L. REV. 213, 221 (2008). 
36 See Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 891, 916 (2006).   
37 See Camisha L. Simmons, Lenders and Directors Beware of the Dead-Hand Proxy Put, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2015, at 20. 
38 See Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 164 (2015). 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 See id.  
42 Id.  
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d). 
44 Id. § 214. 
45 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 
13:22, Westlaw LAWOFCORP (database updated Dec. 2019). 
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otherwise, the majority just wins every seat. Under DGCL § 141(k)(2) 
the majority shareholders cannot remove the minority’s directors 
without cause if there are still sufficient votes to have elected them 
originally.46 In the case of a closely-held corporation, to avoid the risk 
that a few shareholders may gang up on another, some companies 
include a unanimity (supermajority) requirement in the charter under § 
102(b)(4), which has the practical effect of giving a board member a 
veto right.47  
 
C. Business Judgement Rule and Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
 
Under DGCL § 141(a), a company’s board of directors has broad 
discretion to make decisions about the behavior of the corporation.48 
(Officers might typically be thought of as running the corporation, but 
this depends on how active the board of directors is.) Most publicly-
traded companies include a provision in the charter allowing the board 
to amend bylaws.49 However, a bylaw provision that would limit the 
board’s discretion is invalid for violating DGCL § 141(a).50 The 
business judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the board 
applied upon judicial review of board actions.51 The business judgment 
rule applies as long as there was no fraud or illegality on the part of the 
board, decisions were informed and made in good faith, and the board 
had no direct financial stake that would constitute a conflict of interest.52 
Burden is placed on the plaintiff to show violations of one of the above; 
if they do, then the burden shifts to the board to show that the action was 







46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(2). 
47 Id. § 102(b)(4). 
48 Id. § 141(a). 
49 See, Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to 
the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 10 (2011). 
50 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
51 See, Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business 
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 996 (1994). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 985. 
54 Id. at 973. 
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An illustration may be helpful. Imagine that the board of an automobile 
company decided to sell the cars it manufactured to its own workers at 
a “worker’s discount” of 50%. Shareholders might object to this on the 
ground that such discounts would deny the company of potential 
revenue and profits, which might exert downward pressure on the 
company’s share price. They might sue the board of directors for 
allowing such damaging behavior. Under the business judgment rule, a 
court would typically defer to the decisions of the board of directors, 
affording it substantial discretion. A justification by the board of 
directors that the worker’s discount engendered worker loyalty or 
avoided the embarrassing spectacle of competitors’ cars in the company 
parking lot might be sufficient to defeat the shareholders’ action.  
 
Because it is impractical for shareholders to closely monitor the board 
and because of the board’s broad discretion under the business judgment 
rule, Delaware corporate law imposes fiduciary duties on the board that 
mandate the board to act in a manner that benefits shareholders.55 The 
traditional common law approach narrowly focuses on the objective of 
a corporation to profit and benefit the shareholders by increasing 
wealth.56 Regarding stakeholder interest, Delaware common law 
generally imposes a duty to act in the best interest of the shareholders, 
and the board can consider other stakeholders only to the extent that the 
consideration is rationally related to benefits that accrue to 
shareholders.57 In Revlon v. MacAndrews, the court explicitly stated that 
the board may consider stakeholder interest to the extent that the benefit 






55 Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2007). 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1279-82 
(6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a corporation had no common law or contractual obligation to 
consider the effects of plant closures on employees or communities in which the plants were 
located); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (holding that a corporation did not owe fiduciary duties to bondholders); Mark E. Van 
Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 86 
(1996). 
58 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
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D. Companies’ Strategic Choices Under Delaware 
Corporate Law 
 
Under Delaware corporate law, the Delaware Supreme Court has upheld 
the notion that shareholder benefits are still the primary concern of the 
board of directors.59  
 
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist 
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards 
that accompany that form. Those standards include 
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the 
benefit of its stockholders . . . . Directors of a for-profit 
Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to 
defend a business strategy that openly eschews 
stockholder wealth maximization—at least not 
consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under 
Delaware law.60 
 
Judge Strine notes that corporations may be able to change the 
shareholder supremacy default when he writes:  
 
It may well be the case that a certificate of incorporation 
that said that a for-profit corporation would put other 
constituencies’ interests on par with stockholders would, 
in view of § 101(b) [noting that corporations may be 
formed for ‘any lawful business or purposes’], be 
respected and supersede the corporate common law. But, 
in the case of silence, the idea that directors can 
subordinate stockholder interests to other interests of the 
directors’ choosing is strained and at odds with the 







60 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34-35 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
61 Leo E. Strine Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783 (2015). 
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There might be some room for the board to take into account other 
stakeholders’ benefit. To start with, despite a board’s fiduciary duty, 
nothing in the body of corporate law in Delaware technically limits a 
board from considering anything temporarily. In fact, under DGCL § 
122, shareholders can expressly provide for the power of the board to 
account for ethical or philanthropic considerations.62 Furthermore, 
under DGCL § 141(a), the board has broad discretion subject to the 
charter.63 Therefore, a company can provide for consideration of non-
shareholders in the charter. One proposing consideration of stakeholder 
interest could argue taking any stakeholder benefits into account 
benefits the company in the long run. Sometimes a board is explicitly 
authorized to consider non-monetary factors in the decision-making 
process. For example, under Citizens United v. FEC, corporations have 
first amendment rights to express political opinions, and the government 
cannot chill their political speech.64 Culture is another factor a board 
might consider. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the 
preservation of Time’s culture of journalistic integrity was part of the 
Board’s long-term strategy to maximize shareholder value.65 The 
substantial difference, however, is that these cases base their rationale 
on the premise that these non-monetary factors nevertheless benefit 
shareholders in the long run.  
 
One of the most essential strategic choices a board faces is whether to 
distribute their profits as dividends or to reinvest. Under Delaware 
corporate law, mechanics exists to ensure distribution of dividends, 
which, on the flip side, limits reinvestment. Under DGCL § 170, unlike 
interest payments on debt, which are fixed by contract, dividends are 
discretionary even for preferred stock.66 However, preferred 
stockholders sometimes implement mechanisms to ensure the issuance 
of dividends. For example, some shareholders would enter into a 





62 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122. 
63 Id. § 141(a). 
64 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“We return to the principle . . . that the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity.”). 
65 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-52 (Del. 1989). 
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170. 
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requires all votes be cast in favor of certain shareholders’ nominees in 
the event that dividends are not paid.67 Others force a penalty provision 
that triggers contingent voting rights when dividends are not paid.68  
 
Delaware has made attempts to account for stakeholders. For example, 
DGCL §§ 361 to 368 provide for a new type of corporation, a benefit 
corporation, which is a for-profit firm, but whose board is required to 
consider not just shareholders’ financial interests, but also the 
environment and society in its actions.69   
 
III. Stakeholder Representation on Corporate Boards 
 
There have been relatively few theoretical or empirical studies on the 
Accountable Capitalism Act since its recent proposal, despite numerous 
in-depth theoretical studies on stakeholder participation. Theoretical 
studies have discussed the rationale of long-term benefit of stakeholder 
participation and different failed proposals in American history.70 These 
studies, however, are largely based on the European codetermination 
model. Since the European corporate law model differs considerably 
from its counterpart in America,71 these studies bear only reference 
value. The findings of this simulation have filled a gap in empirical 









67 Id. § 218(c). 
68 PAUL J. GALANTI, 18 INDIANA PRACTICE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 20.10, Westlaw 
INPRAC (database updated Oct. 2020). 
69 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-68. 
70 See, e.g., Julian Constain, A New Standard for Governance: Reflections on Worker 
Representation in the United States, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 409 (2019); Karen 
Bradshaw, Agency Engagement with Stakeholder Collaborations, in Wildfire Policy and 
Beyond, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 437, 440 (2019); J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory 
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A. Theoretical Studies 
 
1. The Accountable Capitalism Act  
 
As one of the few scholars who has closely examined the Accountable 
Capitalism Act since its proposal, Brett McDonnell has suggested that 
having employees elect representatives to the board of directors can 
change corporate as well as director behavior through information 
sharing and creating incentives.72 McDonnell suggests that when 
employees elect directors from the population of employees themselves, 
those representatives will have direct knowledge about what and how 
decisions affect their fellow employees.73 Furthermore, the collective 
behavior of the board will inevitably be affected because these 
employee-selected directors are motivated to take into account their 
own interests.74 Therefore, the Accountable Capitalism Act “address[es] 
the separation of benefit from control directly.”75 
 
Furthermore, when there is no incentive benefit of employee voting, 
directors may not take into account employees’ or other stakeholders’ 
benefit despite their awareness of such interest.76 McDonnell proposes 
that with employees possessing voting rights, directors will be more 
likely to convey information of concern to employees and account for 
their interest in solicitation of votes.77 He also notes that these changes 
of behavior are theoretically different in public companies, as those 
companies bear more short-term pressure from the market.78  
 
In examining the German codetermination system, O’Connor similarly 
proposed that it “restrains opportunistic conduct” by corporations 





72 See Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social 
Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 82 (2018). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 102.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 118. 
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implicit employment arrangements.79 The concept of codetermination 
was first created and adopted in Europe.80 Germany is the first and 
perhaps most typical example of a worker-representation corporate 
structure.81 Their Codetermination Act of 1976 mandates that 
companies with more than 2000 employees have employees appoint one 
half of their directors.82 Different than American corporations, German 
companies have a separate supervisory board that oversees corporate 
behaviors.83 Therefore, the workforce is, to some extent, granted a veto 
power in the running of company business.  
 
Despite these positive enforcements that he believes will lead 
companies to “more effectively and consistently consider and give 
weight to the interests of” other stakeholder groups, McDonnell pointed 
out the potential increased cost of collective action and conflicts.84 
Specifically, employees must be able to make collective moves and 
devise a way to cast their vote in a manner that will sway the board’s 
decision-making process.85 He believes this is the reason why, 
compared to other stakeholders such as consumers and the environment, 
employees may benefit more from a codetermination corporate 
structure.86 
 
McDonnell’s concern with collective action cost is particularly relevant 
in the context of Delaware corporate law. Scholars have already noted 
that shareholders have less control over corporate behavior than 
directors, especially at present under the business judgment rule. In his 
paper examining the effectiveness of the Accountable Capitalism Act, 
Julian Constain pointed to the fact that many European codetermination 





79 See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 937 (1993). 
80 Id. at 902. 
81 Id. at 963. 
82 Hans-Joachim Mertens & Erich Schanze, The German Codetermination Act of 1976, 2 J. 
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 75, 75 (1979). 
83 O’Connor, supra note 79, at 936. 
84 McDonnell, supra note 72, at 102-03. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 104. 
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unions.87 Labor unions in the United States, however, cannot be said to 
be as effective as their counterparts in Europe.88 
 
2. Other Models of Stakeholder Participation 
 
Murray proposed the adoption of a stakeholder advisory board as a form 
of stakeholder participation in 2017.89 Murray argues that socially 
conscious firms will function better with an advisory board consisting 
of stakeholders who also have some corporate governance power in 
addition to directly providing information about stakeholder needs to 
the board of directors.90 Modeled after the existing forms in Germany 
and Japan, Murray proposed a two-tier board system where the 
stakeholder advisory board includes representatives from all the major 
corporate stakeholder groups.91 Under this model, stakeholder 
representatives on the advisory board have a proper purpose for 
accessing books and records and will meet with the board of directors 
on a regular basis to engage in face-to-face dialogue regarding the issues 
facing the stakeholder groups. Stakeholder representatives will create 
regular reports to communicate with their respective groups and share 
progress. Murray proposed that stakeholder representatives should also 
have selective power in the form of proxy access rights, stakeholder 
proposal rights, and voting rights in change of control and board election 
situations. The major concern about this model is that directors will be 
self-seeking, although derivative lawsuits would still be available in 
those situations to check misbehaving directors.92 
 
B. Empirical Studies 
 
The authors could not locate any empirical studies directly addressing 
the Accountable Capitalism Act. Julian Constain discussed a 2014 study 





87 See Constain, supra note 70, at 427. 
88 Id. 
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security.”93 Specifically, Constain noted that companies with a quasi-
parity codetermination framework had a thirteen-percent difference in 
employment compared to firms without it.94 Constain also pointed out 
that empirical studies on the effectiveness of German codetermination 
often reached conflicting conclusions.95  
There have not been numerous empirical studies on the European 
codetermination model. Felix FitzRoy and Kornelius Kraft explored the 
impact of two kinds of board level worker codetermination on the 
productivity of firms.96 In Germany, companies with 500–2,000 
employees are required to allow employees to elect one third of their 
supervisory boards.97 FitzRoy and Kraft found that the move toward 
worker codetermination after 1976 seems to have only slightly 
increased productivity in the affected firms.98 The one-third 
codetermination also had a positive productivity coefficient in one 
specification.99 FitzRoy and Kraft’s result rejects the critical view that 
the move towards codetermination was primarily re-distributional.100 To 
the contrary, Felix Hörisch’s study demonstrates that higher levels of 
codetermination in western welfare states are associated with more 
equally distributed income levels.101 Based on this result, Felix Hörisch 
concluded that codetermination is a political institution which improves 
distributive justice.102 
 
IV. Participatory Simulations 
 
This research builds on substantial previous work in the design of 
participatory simulations. Participatory simulations are “role-playing 





93 Constain, supra note 70, at 430. 
94 Id. at 430-31. 
95 Id. at 430. 
96 See generally Felix R. FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-Determination, Efficiency, and 
Productivity (Inst. for the Study of Lab., IZA Discussion Paper No. 1442, 2004). 
97 Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat [DrittelbG] [Third 
Participation Act], July 1, 2004, BUNDESGESETZBLATT JAHRGANG [BGBL I] at 974, § 1 (Ger.). 
98 FitzRoy & Kraft, supra note 96, at 19.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 13, 15, 19.  
101 Felix Hörisch, The Macro-Economic Effect of Codetermination on Income Equality 15 
(Universität Mannheim, Working Paper No. 147, 2012). 
102 Id. at 20. 
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over time.”103 Researchers have used non-interactive simulations to 
enact many different hypothetical scenarios, from wars,104 to fires,105 to 
natural resource constraints,106 to groups of people working 
collaboratively.107 Agent-based modeling has been employed in a range 
of fields, particularly in economics and policy analysis.108 
 
Participatory simulations move beyond purely computational 
simulations by enabling human decision-making to influence the 
outcome of the simulation in real time. This human participation is 
particularly relevant in contexts where humans may behave in ways that 
are irrational,109 unpredictable, or otherwise not easily simulated. 





103 Wilensky & Stroup, supra note 12, at 668. 
104 See Robert C. Rubel, The Epistemology of War Gaming, 59 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., 
Spring 2006, at 108. 
105 See, e.g., Richard Bukowski & Carlo Séquin, Interactive Simulation of Fire in Virtual 
Building Environments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER 
GRAPHICS AND INTERACTIVE TECHNIQUES 35 (1997), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1145/258734.258757. 
106 Nicolas Becu et al., Participatory Simulation to Foster Social Learning on Coastal 
Flooding Prevention, 98 ENV’T MODELLING & SOFTWARE 1, 1 (2017); C. Legrand et 
al., Participatory Simulation for Coordination Awareness Concerning Small Water 
Infrastructure and Drought Adaptation Planning in Semi-Arid Mozambique (2014) (presented 
at the 15th WaterNet/WARFSA/GWP-SA Symposium), available at 
https://agritrop.cirad.fr/574932/1/document_574932.pdf.  
107 Nathan Bos et al., In-Group/Out-Group Effects in Distributed Teams: An Experimental 
Simulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2004 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED 
COOPERATIVE WORK 429, available at https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1031607.1031679. 
108 See generally Keari Bell-Gawne et al., Meaningful Play: The Intersection of Video Games 
and Environmental Policy, 5 WORLD FUTURES REV. 244 (2013); Eric Bonabeau, Agent-Based 
Modeling: Methods and Techniques for Simulating Human Systems, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S.A. 7280 (2002); LYNNE HAMILL & NIGEL GILBERT, AGENT-BASED MODELLING IN 
ECONOMICS (2015); AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A. JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING 
TOGETHER (2010); STEVEN F RAILSBACK & VOLKER GRIMM, AGENT-BASED AND INDIVIDUAL-
BASED MODELING: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION (2012); Matteo G. Richiardi, The Future of 
Agent-Based Modeling, 43 E. ECON. J. 271 (2017); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Mauro Gallegati, 
Heterogeneous Interacting Agent Models for Understanding Monetary Economies, 37 E. 
ECON. J. 6 (2011). 
109 See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS (2010). 
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a variety of educational goals110 in fields such as ecology,111 
biodiversity,112 sustainable cities,113 and coastal flooding.114 Previous 
work has also broadened the concept of participatory simulation to 
contributory simulation, in which participants make “informed, critical 
changes to the underlying scientific model.”115 In addition to their 
educational value, participatory simulations have substantial potential 
for examining the effectiveness of various societal institutions, such as 
procedures for disaster evacuation.116 Researchers have explored how 





110 See Eric Klopfer et al., Using Palm Technology in Participatory Simulations of Complex 
Systems: A New Take on Ubiquitous and Accessible Mobile Computing, 14 J. SCI. EDUC. & 
TECH. 285 (2005); See also Chengjiu Yin et al., Developing and Implementing a Framework 
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SOC’Y 137 (2013). 
111 Tom Moher et al., WallCology: Designing Interaction Affordances for Learner 
Engagement in Authentic Science Inquiry, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON 
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Sustainable Cities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
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governments,117 behavior change in the healthcare context,118 and teens’ 
financial literacy.119 Various types of stakeholder modeling,120 
including participatory simulations, have been used to investigate 
decision-making processes of agents, including implementations in city 
logistics121 and the healthcare sector.122 Participatory simulation has 
been incorporated into simulation research123 and theoretically linked to 
crowd work.124 Over the past several years, there has been growing 
interest in similar approaches in a range of disciplines,125 particularly in 
the field of empirical legal studies.126 Nevertheless, the use of 
participatory, computer-based simulation to test hypotheses about 
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In addition, as the research described here focuses on the design of 
participatory simulations to design social institutions, this work is 
similar to meta-design, defined by Fischer and Giaccardi as “defining 
and creating social and technical infrastructures in which new forms of 
collaborative design can take place.”127 However, it does not fall 
squarely into Fischer and Giaccardi’s definition because “users” of 
social institutions may not be empowered to engage in meaningful co-
creation of the institutions that they are working within, except through 
the indirect routes of voting and advocacy. 
 
V. Description of DirectorSim Game 
 
To interrogate the relationship between Delaware corporate law and the 
Accountable Capitalism Act, the research team developed a simple 
interactive business simulation.128 This simulation focused on two 
elements that differ across the two legal frameworks: the set of 
stakeholders that directors are expected to consider in their decision-









127 Gerhard Fischer & Elisa Giaccardi, Meta-Design: A Framework for the Future of End-User 
Development, in 9 END USER DEVELOPMENT 427, 427 (Lieberman et al. eds., 2006). 
128 All code for this system is open source and available at https://github.com/wmt-at-ics-uci-
edu/corporate-simulation [https://perma.cc/9M74-X25M]. 




Figure 1: The simulated business world. There are five corporations, with the human 
participant controlling the one in the middle. The share price is displayed over each 
corporation. The happiness of the employees is displayed by the color and expression 
of the face icons around each corporation. The background changes color as the ground 




To explore the different effects of these two legal frameworks, we 
developed five hypotheses: 
 
● Hypothesis 1 (“H1”): Participants instructed to act as 
shareholder-selected directors under Delaware corporate law will place 
greater emphasis on shareholders than on other stakeholder groups 
when forced to choose between them. 
 
● H2: Participants instructed to act as shareholder-selected 
directors under Delaware corporate law will place greater emphasis on 
shareholders, when forced to choose, than do those under Accountable 
Capitalism Act. 
 
● H3: Participants instructed to act as shareholder-selected 
directors under Delaware corporate law will prefer polarized approaches 
that benefit only shareholders over balanced approaches that benefit all 
stakeholder groups. 




● H4: Participants instructed to act as shareholder-selected 
directors under Delaware corporate law will exhibit a greater preference 
for polarized approaches that benefit only shareholders than do those 
under Accountable Capitalism Act. 
 
● H5: Boards of directors instructed by the Accountable 
Capitalism Act will produce decisions that balance the interests of 
different stakeholder groups more effectively than those instructed by 





The overarching structure of the participatory simulation is as follows: 
a participant visits a website, where they are shown a tutorial in the form 
of a series of slides. The tutorial teaches them about the role of corporate 
directors, assigns them to be a certain type of director (for example, 
shareholder-selected or employee-selected), and provides a summarized 
version of the Accountable Capitalism Act. Next, the tutorial introduces 
them to the major visual elements of the simulation—the participant’s 
corporation (represented by a factory icon with a share price above it), 
as well as several competitor corporations; 250 workers (represented by 
small faces that may be smiling, neutral, or frowning); 250 worker 
houses; and the background of the world, which varies from green to 
brown based on the level of pollution at a given location. After the 
tutorial, the simulation begins. Participants are shown approximately six 
seconds of the visualization unfolding (see Figure 1), followed by a 
popup asking them to decide how the corporation should act in a given 
situation (see Figure 2). The decision popup presents a brief summary 
of their job as director and the law that applies to them, and asks them 
to choose between two possible choices, represented by charts showing 
how much each of three stakeholder groups (shareholders, employees, 
and environment) would be favored by either choice. The simulation 
pauses while they make their decision, so that they have as much time 
as they need to decide on a course of action. Once they select a choice, 
the visualization continues, showing them the effects of their decision. 
After twelve rounds of decision-followed-by-visualization, the decision 
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The “world” of the business simulation consists of a variety of 
components: corporations, individuals, houses, and the environment.  
 
There are five corporations in the world, with autonomous corporations 
in each corner, and the participant-directed corporation in the center (see 
Figure 1). The participant-directed corporation behaves in whatever 
manner the participant dictates through their decisions. Each of the four 
autonomous corporations follows a different computationally 
determined strategy, one favoring shareholders, one favoring 
employees, one favoring the environment, and one taking a balanced 
strategy. Whenever the participant is asked to make a decision, the other 
four corporations evaluate the same two choices and choose the one that 
most closely matches their strategy. 
 
Corporations each have a share price, a value that represents how well 
the corporation is providing value to shareholders. This value is 
displayed above the corporation’s icon. Share price is directly affected 
by the decisions the directors make. A low value in the “Share Price” 
column of a decision chart (see Figure 2) causes share price to fall, while 
a high value causes share price to increase. 
 
Each corporation has fifty individuals working for it—forty workers and 
ten directors—each represented by a face icon that can be smiling, 
neutral, or frowning. Each individual has a value for their happiness, 
with zero representing low happiness and one representing high 
happiness. All individuals are green and smiling when their happiness 
is high, yellow and with a neutral facial expression when medium, or 
red and frowning when low. In the current simulation, happiness is 
solely dictated by income. We recognize that this is an impoverished 
model of happiness. In a future version of this simulation, the team plans 
to implement more complex relationships among income, 
environmental quality, and other factors, as well as a more engaging 
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experience for participants.129 In the current system, employee income 
is based on the decisions the directors of that corporation make. Director 
income is based on the corporation’s share price. 
 
Although there are ten individuals displayed as directors per corporation 
in the visualization, the single human participant makes all decisions 
that affect the corporation’s behavior. The directors in the visualization 
simply serve to provide a visual indicator that a subset of individuals 
have happiness based on share price rather than employee wage. 
 
Additionally, there are 250 houses in the world. Each house is home to 
one individual. Individuals move from their home to their corporation 
and back every three seconds. Houses are mapped into the world so that 
the individuals work for the corporation nearest their house. For this 
reason, fifty houses surround each corporation, one house per individual 
working for the corporation, forming a “company town” surrounding 
each firm. 
 
The background of the world starts off green, but each region turns 
shades of green and brown based on the level of pollution at that 
location. Corporations that make decisions with low values for 
“Environmental Benefit” introduce pollution into their surrounding 
regions. Each region can absorb and recover from a certain amount of 
pollution per time step; therefore, if a corporation starts making 
decisions with a high value in the “Environmental Benefit” column, the 




The purpose behind the tutorial is to clarify the various aspects of the 
simulation. The tutorial starts by initially describing the purpose of the 
study. As the participant clicks the “next” button and is led through the 
sequence of the tutorial, they are informed about their role as a director 





129 See generally Bonnie Nardi et al., Productive Play: Beyond Binaries, 2 ARTIFACT 60 
(2008); KATHERINE ISBISTER, BETTER GAME CHARACTERS BY DESIGN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
APPROACH (2006). 
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about the specific law that applies to them. Following this, the tutorial 
takes the participant through the rest of the system, step by step, 
showing the share price, the number of houses, the role of happiness 




In the tutorial and on each decision popup, there is a brief summary of 
the relevant section of Delaware corporate law or the Accountable 
Capitalism Act. For ease of understanding, the relevant legal text was 
reduced to a summary of less than 100 words in each case. This 
summarization was done in collaboration with a law professor to ensure 
that the legal meaning was preserved. In addition, various other 
simplifications were introduced, such as reducing the number of factors 
that directors must consider under the Accountable Capitalism Act from 
seven to three. Despite these simplifications, every effort was taken to 
retain the spirit of the laws. 
 
The summary of Delaware corporate law presented to participants was 
as follows: 
 
Directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty and duty of care 
to the corporation and its shareholders. Directors must 
act in good faith to advance the best interests of the 
corporation. The corporation may undertake any lawful 
business by any lawful means. Directors must exercise 
good-faith efforts to ensure that the corporation complies 
with laws applicable to its operations (such as 
environmental, labor, and criminal laws). Directors are 
prohibited from using their positions to advance their 
own personal interests. 
 
The summary of the Accountable Capitalism Act presented to 
participants was as follows: 
 
Directors shall manage the corporation in a way that 
balances the financial interests of its shareholders with 
the best interests of persons that are materially affected 
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by the conduct of the corporation. In doing so, directors 
shall consider the effects of any action or inaction on the 
shareholders of the corporation; the employees of the 
corporation; and the environment. Directors shall not be 
required to give priority to a particular interest or factor 
[for example, shareholders, employees, or the 
environment] over any other interest or factor. 
 
F. Experimental Parameters 
 
The website’s URL includes a parameter to specify whether the 
participant is assigned to be a shareholder-selected director (“SSD”) or 
employee-selected director (“EmSD”), and a second parameter to 
specify whether the participant was shown instructions based on the 




After clicking through each slide of the tutorial, participants are asked 
to make a series of decisions between two choices, each represented by 
a bar chart. Each chart has one bar showing how beneficial that chart 
will be for share price, one bar for how beneficial it will be for employee 
wage, and one bar for how beneficial it will be for the environment (see 
Figure 2). The value of all three bars in any given chart always sums to 
1.0. That means that there is an inherent trade-off between the three 
stakeholder groups. While this is not an accurate representation of the 
real world, where there is not always a zero-sum game among different 
stakeholders and all possible actions do not have the same total “value,” 
the team chose to represent decisions in this way in order to be able to 
force hard choices on the participants. Ultimately, hard choices reveal 
where decisions are most important and where differences in opinion 
are most prominent. 
 
 




Figure 2: This screen was presented to participants periodically to require them to 
make decisions about which action their corporation should take. 
 
Every player is given the same set of decisions between two charts; 
however, the simulation randomizes both the order in which the 
decisions are delivered, as well as the order in which the choices in each 
decision are presented. Therefore, it avoids order effects in both cases. 
Each choice, displayed to participants as a bar chart (see Figure 2), can 
also be presented as three numbers, representing shareholder benefit, 
employee benefit, and environmental benefit. For example, (1.0, 0.0, 
0.0) would represent a choice with the highest possible value for 
shareholders and the lowest possible value for both employees and the 
environment. 
 
There were several main types of decisions presented to each 
participant. There were three “balance” decisions, each of which asked 
participants to choose between a strongly polarized chart, e.g., (1.0, 0.0, 
0.0) favoring one of the three stakeholders versus a balanced chart (0.34, 
0.33, 0.33). There were three “forced choice” decisions, one between 
each pair of the three stakeholders: shareholders vs. employees, 
shareholders vs. environment, and employees vs. environment. In each 
of these forced choices, the chart for one choice had 0.8 for one 
stakeholder and 0.1 for each of the other two, e.g. (0.8, 0.1, 0.1); the 
chart for the other choice had 0.8 for a different stakeholder and 0.1 for 
the other two, e.g. (0.1, 0.8, 0.1). In addition, there were six other 
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decisions, three of the form (0.5, 0.5, 0.0) vs. (0.5, 0.0, 0.5), and three 
of the form (0.5, 0.25, 0.25) vs. (0.34, 0.33, 0.33). 
 
Given space considerations, all analyses in this paper are based on the 
three “forced choice” and the three “balance” decisions.  
 
H. End of Game Questions 
 
After completing all twelve decisions, the participants were asked 
several questions: “Please describe how you made your decisions. What 
factors did you consider when choosing between the two possibilities?”; 
“Did you notice your decisions having any impact on the simulation? If 
so, what effects did your decisions have?”; and “Did the simulation 
change how you thought about how to respond to the choices you 
needed to make as a director of a corporation? Why or why not?” 
Participants were also given a free entry text box for any other thoughts 
they might have had. 
 
For each question, participants were required to write at least 100 
characters of response. In addition, after the free-response questions, 
there were questions gathering demographic data involving country of 
residence, age, and gender. Gender was collected in line with best 
practices in human-computer interaction.130 
 
VI. Evaluation Methodology 
 
To assess whether the hypotheses described above were borne out by 
the data, the team conducted a series of experiments using human 
participants via AMT, Amazon’s online crowdsourcing platform. In 
AMT, requesters (such as the research team) can post small jobs (called 
“Human Intelligence Tasks” or “HITs”) to a public website, and people 
around the world can choose to complete the HITs in exchange for 
payment. There are typically several thousand workers available at any 





130 See Katta Spiel et al., How to Do Better with Gender on Surveys, INTERACTIONS, July-Aug. 
2019, at 62. 
131 Djellel Difallah et al., Demographics and Dynamics of Mechanical Turk Workers, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB SEARCH AND DATA 




A. Qualifying Quiz 
 
To ensure that participants had read and understood the relevant law, 
the team deployed a short qualifying quiz through the AMT interface, 
where workers were asked to read the summary of the Accountable 
Capitalism Act and answer a few (relatively simple) questions about 
what they had read, as a preliminary task. For example, participants 
were asked “Which of the following elements are directors required to 
balance under the laws described above (select all that apply)?”, with 
three answers derived directly from the text and two plausible-but-fake 
answers. Workers who earned a perfect score were then invited back for 
the actual experiment. The purpose behind this process was to ensure 
the competence of the workers and high-quality work. 
 
B. Pilot Studies 
 
We conducted three pilot studies to refine the experimental procedures. 
In line with Kittur et al.,132 we sought to make the HITs as easy to do 
correctly as it would be to do it at random. In the first pilot, the 
qualifying quiz was deployed as a separate HIT from the main study. 
However, when the team deployed the experiment to the workers who 
had succeeded on the qualifying quiz, they found that very few of those 
workers participated in the second HIT. We had set the pilot study’s 
level of pay at a rate that was aiming for (and later confirmed to be) at 
least $15 per hour, which is a relatively high pay rate for AMT, so the 
team decided that it must be the structure of the qualifying quiz followed 







MINING 135, 135 (2018), available at https://www.ipeirotis.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/wsdmf074-difallahA.pdf. 
132 Aniket Kittur, Ed H. Chi & Bongwon Suh, Crowdsourcing User Studies with Mechanical 
Turk, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 




2021] TOMLINSON ET AL. 107 
 
 
In the second and third pilot studies, the team instead implemented both 
the quiz and the actual experiment in the same HIT (the quiz in AMT 
followed by a link out to the simulation website), deciding to simply 
discard the data from those who received less than a perfect score. Over 
the course of these pilots, the team also revised various aspects of legal 
wording and interface design.  
 
C. Fair Payment/Treatment 
 
To determine the appropriate rate of pay for the final study, the team 
drew on research by Silberman et al.133 We wanted to ensure that our 
wage came out to $15 per hour. To concretely establish how long the 
study would take, the team recorded a time stamp when participants 
clicked the first slide of the tutorial, and another one when they 
submitted the demographics. We also added several minutes to provide 
time for workers to take the brief quiz in AMT. We identified the 
average time to be approximately 17.6 minutes, so the team set the pay 
at $4.40 per completion of HIT. Results from the workers’ free response 
questions validated that the rate of pay was reasonable, including quotes 
such as “I thought it was a very good experiment and the pay was very 
good”; “I also felt compensation was fair when compared to other tasks 
on MTURK”; and “thanks for the generous hit! It pays very well for the 
time needed.” 
 
In addition, to ensure fair treatment of the workers, the team responded 
to all queries received as soon as possible. The team believes they were 
able to resolve all issues to the satisfaction of the workers who contacted 
them. 
 
D. Runs Conducted 
 
To assess the five hypotheses listed above, we deployed three 
experimental conditions. We recruited 100 participants to each of the 





133 M.S. Silberman et al., Responsible Research with Crowds: Pay Crowdworkers at Least 
Minimum Wage, 61 COMMC’NS ACM 39 (2018). 
134 A version of the description of results from the SSD/ACA and EmSD/ACA participants 
appeared earlier in a conference publication. See generally Tomlinson et al., supra note 10. 




● Shareholder-Selected Directors instructed via Accountable 
Capitalism Act text (“SSD/ACA”) 
 
● Shareholder-Selected Directors instructed via Delaware 
corporate law text (“SSD/Delaware”) 
 
● Employee-Selected Directors instructed via Accountable 
Capitalism Act text (“EmSD/ACA”) 
 
The 300 participants completed the study within approximately 24 
hours of its placement on AMT. 
 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 were assessed by comparing how SSD/ACA, 
SSD/Delaware, and EmSD/ACA participants responded to the three 
“forced choice” decisions. Hypotheses H3 and H4 were assessed by 
comparing how SSD/ACA, SSD/Delaware, and EmSD/ACA 
participants responded to the three “balance” decisions. Hypothesis H5 
assessed via a multi-stage process in which we (1) assembled three 
thousand “virtual boards of directors,” each composed of various 
combinations of specific SSD/ACA, SSD/Delaware, and EmSD/ACA 
participants; (2) used those participants’ responses to conduct “virtual 
votes” on each of the “forced choice” and “balance” decisions; and (3) 
used the outcomes of those votes to determine how the corporate 
behavior specified by each of these differently-composed boards 




A. Excluded Data 
 
The study team excluded two subsets of the data collected from this 
analysis. First, as described in the Qualifying Quiz section above, 
participants who scored less than 100% on the initial quiz were 





However, the SSD/Delaware results; the comparisons between SSD/Delaware and SSD/ACA; 
and the results from this set of virtual boards of directors are all novel here. 
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and understood the law in question. This helped provide a higher level 
of participant expertise throughout the study. Second, several 
participants did not write original content in their end-of-game 
questions as requested, but rather pasted blocks of text from various 
internet articles or copied other participants. Since these participants 
were not engaging with the study in good faith, all their data were 
excluded. Some individuals fell into both excluded categories (i.e., poor 
performance on the quiz as well as copying of internet content). In total, 





The team collected demographics about the study population in line 
with best practices described above. The average age of participants 
included in the analysis was 39 years. This is substantially younger than 
the average age of many boards of directors (62 years).135 Fifty-six 
percent of participants were men, 43% women, and 1% non-binary or 
preferred not to describe (one participant in each category). This is a bit 
more balanced than the 80% of men and 20% of women on corporate 
boards of directors.136 Regarding country of residence, 86% of 
participants were from the United States, 12% from India, and 2% from 
other countries (one participant each from Italy, New Caledonia, 












135 Annalisa Barrett & Jon Lukomnik, Age Diversity Within Boards of Directors of the S&P 
500 Companies, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (April 6, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/06/age-diversity-within-boards-of-directors-of-the-
sp-500-companies/ [https://perma.cc/BS4M-XZRF]. 
136 2020 Women on Boards, GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 4 (2018), https://2020wob.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/2020WOB_Gender_Diversity_Index_Report_Oct2019.pdf. Non-
binary people are not mentioned in this report. 





1. Delaware directors favor shareholders over other 
stakeholders, when forced to choose. 
 
The study confirmed H1, the hypothesis that participants assigned as 
shareholder-selected directors under Delaware corporate law 
(SSD/Delaware) will place greater emphasis on shareholders when 
forced to choose between shareholders and a different stakeholder 
group. As reported elsewhere,137 participants assigned as shareholder-
selected directors under the Accountable Capitalism Act (SSD/ACA) 
tended to favor shareholders over other stakeholders (61.8%, 
p=0.0016*), while SSD/Delaware participants exhibited a preference 
for shareholders over other stakeholders in 61.3% of the cases 
(p=0.0021*). See Table 1 for details. 
 
These findings are supported by participants’ quotes. An SSD/Delaware 
participant wrote: “I always did what would be best for the share price 
at the expense of other elements. If two options had the same impact on 
that, I tended to do what would help the employees the most. I 
disregarded the environmental element.” A different SSD/Delaware 
participant wrote: “I made my decisions based on my fiduciary duty to 
the company and its shareholders. That means I prioritized the company 
first, the employees second, and the environment third. My decisions 















137 See Tomlinson et al., supra note 10. 













SSD/Delaware Employees 60.2 93 0.049* 
SSD/Delaware Environment 62.3 93 0.017* 
SSD/Delaware Both 61.3 186 0.0021* 
SSD/ACA Employees 59.6 89 0.071 
SSD/ACA Environment 64.0 89 0.0080* 
SSD/ACA Both 61.8 178 0.0016* 
Table 1: Shareholder-selected directors tend to prefer shareholders over both 
employees and the environment when forced to choose between them. Rows 4-6 from 
previously published work.138 
 
2. Delaware directors and ACA directors favor shareholders 
about the same amount when forced to choose between 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
The study rejected H2—that when forced to choose, directors under 
Delaware corporate law would exhibit stronger preferences for 
shareholders over other stakeholder groups than ACA directors do. 
Findings from the study showed no statistically significant difference 
between how Delaware and ACA directors made such decisions. 
SSD/Delaware directors’ average preference for shareholders over the 
other two stakeholders was 61.3%, while SSD/ACA directors’ average 











138 See id. at 7. 




















Employees 60.2 93 59.6 89 0.93 
Environment 62.4 93 64.0 89 0.81 
Both 61.3 186 61.8 178 0.92 
Table 2: Instruction by the ACA versus instruction by Delaware law does not appear 
to impact the degree to which shareholder-selected directors favor shareholders in 
forced-choice decisions. 
 
3. Delaware directors strongly prefer balanced approaches 
over employees and the environment, but do not statistically prefer 
balanced approaches over shareholders. 
 
While the previous two sections dealt with forced-choice contexts 
where directors were required to choose between an option that favored 
one stakeholder group and another that favored a different stakeholder 
group, this section addresses how directors behaved when asked to 
decide between a choice strongly favoring one stakeholder group and a 
choice that benefited all three stakeholder groups evenly. Previous 
research offered that SSDs under the ACA strongly favored balanced 
choices over polarized choices. Here, H3 hypothesized that SSDs under 
Delaware corporate law would not be constrained by the ACA’s demand 
for balance, and instead would select shareholder-only decisions over 
balanced decisions. However, we found that SSDs under Delaware 
corporate law were slightly less likely (although not to a statistically 
significant degree) to choose an option exclusively favoring 
shareholders over a balanced option. See Table 3 for details. 
 
Nevertheless, SSD/Delaware directors overall were much more likely 
to prefer shareholders over balance than they were to prefer employees 
(p=0.000027**, see Table 4) or the environment (p=0.000012**, see 
Table 5) over balance.  
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The fact that Delaware directors preferred balance could arise from two 
separate forces. The first force would be their interest in supporting the 
shareholders as much as possible (which in two of the three “balance” 
questions could most effectively be achieved by choosing a balanced 
option, since the alternative would be a choice strongly polarized toward 
employees or toward the environment). For example, an SSD under 
Delaware law wrote: “I made my decisions based on my fiduciary duty 
to the company and its shareholders. That means I prioritized the 
company first, the employees second, and the environment third. My 
decisions reflected those priorities.” A second force that could push 
such directors toward balance would be a desire for balance itself. 
Another SSD under Delaware law wrote: “My decisions were based 
both on the instructions that were given regarding my responsibility as 
a director, and my personal moral beliefs.” Given these quotes, it 













SSD/ACA Shareholders 22.5 89 <0.000001** 
SSD/ACA Employees 15.7 89 <0.000001** 
SSD/ACA Environment 18.0 89 <0.000001** 
SSD/Delaware Shareholders 43.0 93 0.18 
SSD/Delaware Employees 15.0 93 <0.000001** 
SSD/Delaware Environment 14.0 93 <0.000001** 
Table 3: Directors under both legal frameworks exhibited a strong tendency to choose 
balance over particular stakeholder groups (as evidenced by low values in the third 
column) except for SSD/Delaware, who show only a weak (and not statistically 





















43.0 93 15.0 93 0.000027** 
















43.0 93 14.0 93 0.000012** 
Table 5: SSD/Delaware are biased toward shareholders more than toward 
environment. 
 
4. Delaware directors place greater emphasis on shareholders 
over balanced approaches than did ACA directors. 
 
The study confirmed H4, finding that SSD/Delaware directors were 
much more likely to prefer balance over shareholders than SSD/ACA 
directors were (43.0% vs. 22.5%, p=0.0032*), even though they were 
statistically similar with regard to their level of preference of employees 
(15.0% vs 15.7%, p=0.90) or the environment (14.0% vs 18.0%, 
p=0.46) over balance. These findings support the proposition that 
Delaware corporate law and the ACA would lead to different kinds of 
director behavior, and therefore different kinds of corporate behavior. 
See Table 6 for more details. 
 
Quotes from the end-of-game questions support these quantitative 
results. For example, an SSD under Delaware law wrote: “I only took 
into account the shareholder’s wants. I wanted to get the share price as 
high as possible. I was hired by the corporation’s shareholders, so it was 
my duty to.”139 Conversely, an SSD under the ACA wrote: “I tried to 
balance allocations evenly between the three priorities. When I wasn’t 





139 Some participants’ comments were lightly edited for grammar and punctuation. 




















Shareholders 22.5 89 43.0 93 0.0032* 
Employees 15.7 89 15.0 93 0.90 
Environment 18.0 89 14.0 93 0.46 
Table 6: While SSDs instructed via Delaware corporate law exhibit a weak preference 
for balance over a polarized choice favoring shareholders, they are nevertheless 
significantly more likely to make the polarized shareholder choice than those 
instructed via the ACA. 
 
5. Virtual boards of directors as constituted by the ACA 
balance different stakeholder groups more effectively than those 
constituted by Delaware corporate law. 
 
Using the results from the AMT participants, the authors created 3000 
virtual boards of directors. These virtual boards confirmed H5, the 
hypothesis that boards of directors instructed by the ACA will produce 
decisions that balance the interests of different stakeholder groups more 
effectively than those instructed by Delaware corporate law. This was 
true for both aspects of the ACA that we studied: the requirement that 
directors consider the effects of corporate actions on various stakeholder 
groups and the requirement that there be employee representation on 
corporate boards. 
 
The process for assembling the virtual boards of directors was as 
follows. Each virtual board had 10 members. Each board was assigned 
a particular composition of different director types, e.g., 60% SSD/40% 
EmSD. Directors of each type were selected at random to populate the 
board in line with that composition. So, for example, in the 60% 
SSD/40% EmSD case, the board was composed of 6 randomly selected 
participants assigned to be SSDs and 4 randomly selected participants 
assigned to be EmSDs. The actual choices made by each participant in 
response to each of the six relevant decisions (i.e., the three “balance” 
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decisions and the three “forced choice” decisions described above) were 
then assembled into a “virtual vote,” with the majority winning. So, for 
example, if seven of the ten participants in that particular virtual board 
selected a shareholder-favoring choice (0.8 for shareholders, 0.1 for 
employees, 0.1 for the environment) over an employee-favoring choice 
(0.1 for shareholders, 0.8 for employees, 0.1 for the environment), then 
the outcome of that decision was for the virtual corporation to take an 
action that resulted in 0.8 benefit for shareholders and 0.1 each for 
employees and the environment. Ties were broken by averaging the 
results from both possible outcomes. The outcomes from the six 
decisions were then averaged to yield the virtual board’s overall benefit 
for each of the three stakeholder groups. This process was repeated 1000 
times for each of the three conditions, reflected in the five rows in Table 
7. So, for example, row 1 reflects 1000 different virtual boards; because 
ninety-three shareholder-selected directors were included in the study 
(100 participants minus those excluded for the reasons described 
above), the average SSD-assigned participant appeared in 
approximately eleven different virtual boards (1000/93) in that row. 
 
Since the nature of the questions limited the range of possible outcomes 
(for example, no set of decisions would lead to a result that completely 
favored any one stakeholder group), the team compared each result to 
the maximum disparity across stakeholders that was possible in the 
system. In this technique, the team calculated the maximum and 
minimum benefits that could have resulted from a given board’s 
choices. Specifically, the six decisions were as follows, with each triplet 
representing the impact on shareholders, employees, and the 
environment, respectively: 
 
● (0.8, 0.1, 0.1) vs (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) 
● (0.8, 0.1, 0.1) vs (0.1, 0.1, 0.8) 
● (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) vs. (0.1, 0.1, 0.8) 
● (1.0, 0.0, 0.0) vs (0.34, 0.33, 0.33) 
● (0.0, 1.0, 0.0) vs (0.33, 0.34, 0.33) 
● (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) vs (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) 
 
Therefore, the maximum average benefit that could possibly have 
accrued to any stakeholder group was: (0.8 + 0.8 + 0.1 + 1.0 + 0.33 + 
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0.33)/6 = 0.56. Similarly, the minimum average benefit that could have 
accrued to any stakeholder group was: (0.1 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.0 + 0.0 + 
0.33)/6 = 0.105. Combining these two, the maximum disparity that 
could possibly have come to exist between two stakeholder groups was 
0.56 - 0.105 = 0.455.   
 
The team then calculated the actual disparity that occurred across the 
averaged outcomes of all 1000 virtual boards of directors for each 
condition (e.g., 60% SSD/40% EmSD), by subtracting the lowest 
stakeholder outcome from the highest stakeholder outcome. This actual 
disparity was then divided by the maximum possible disparity to arrive 
at the percentage of maximum disparity, which is displayed in the last 
two columns of Table 7. The next to last column displays the percentage 
of maximum disparity when only the outcomes for shareholders and 
employees were considered. The last column displays the percentage of 
maximum disparity when the outcomes for all three stakeholder groups 
(shareholders, employees, and the environment) were considered.   
 
To summarize the findings: the first row, representing 1000 boards 
composed of 100% participants assigned as SSDs under Delaware 
corporate law, led to the greatest disparity across all three stakeholder 
groups of the three conditions studied, with 32% of the maximum 
possible disparity across the two human stakeholder groups (i.e., 
shareholders and employees), and 53% disparity across shareholders, 
employees, and the environment. The next row shows how much 
disparity arose from virtual boards of directors composed of 100% SSDs 
under the ACA, representing the effect of the ACA language requiring 
directors to consider the effects on corporate actions on various 
stakeholder groups: 15% of the maximum disparity across shareholders 
and employees and 39% of the maximum disparity across shareholders, 
employees, and the environment. 
 
The last row, involving virtual boards composed of 60% SSDs and 40% 
EmSDs, and thus reflecting both the ACA requirement of stakeholder 
consideration as well as the effect of employee representation, led to the 
lowest observed disparity among stakeholders: 8.3% considering only 
human stakeholders, and 33% across all stakeholders. These levels 
suggest that employee representation reduces disparity by 45% (15% vs. 
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8.3%) across the two human stakeholder groups and 15% (39% vs. 
33%) across all three stakeholder groups below the levels resulting from 
100% SSDs under the ACA. 
 
In total, switching from instruction by Delaware corporate law to 
instruction by the Accountable Capitalism Act led to a 74% reduction 
in disparity (32% vs. 8.3%) across the two human stakeholder groups 
(shareholders and employees), and a 38% reduction in disparity (53% 
vs. 33%) across all three stakeholder groups (shareholders,  























0.46 0.32 0.21 32 53 
100% SSD/ 
ACA 
0.41 0.35 0.24 15 39 
60% SSD,  
40% 
EmSD/ACA 
0.39 0.37 0.24 8.3 33 
Table 7: Results from 3000 “virtual boards of directors,” including 1000 comprised of 
randomly selected shareholder-selected directors instructed under Delaware corporate 
law, 1000 comprised of shareholder-selected directors under the Accountable 
Capitalism Act, and 1000 comprised of 60% shareholder-selected directors and 40% 
employee-selected directors under the ACA. In sum, ACA decreased the disparity of 
outcomes across different stakeholder groups by 74% (32% vs. 8.3%) when 
considering only human stakeholders (shareholders and employees), and by 38% (53% 
vs. 33%) when considering all three stakeholder groups (shareholders, employees, and 
the environment). 
 
VIII.  Implications for Future Legislation 
 
As stated in the previous section, the results of this simulation indicate 
that the Accountable Capitalism Act will likely have the intended result 
regarding board representation and board decision-making processes 
when compared to Delaware corporate law. In this section, we explore 
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certain areas of law on this topic that other scholars could further 
examine.  
 
A. Broader Stakeholder Representation 
 
This study’s findings suggest that both elements of the ACA that were 
studied—the requirement that 2/5 of large corporations’ directors be 
selected by employees rather than shareholders,140 and that those 
directors be required to consider the effects of the corporation’s actions 
on a variety of stakeholder groups—can plausibly be expected to affect 
director behavior. While this is perhaps unsurprising, it nevertheless 
points to an important interdependency between the two. If the goal is 
that directors consider all stakeholder groups on equal footing (which 
may or may not be the intention of the ACA), then both parts are 
necessary. Given that there are seven stakeholder groups listed in the 
ACA and that only one (employees) is required to have representation 
on the board (at least 40%), it is likely that the ACA will result in 
shareholders enjoying the largest fraction of representation on corporate 
boards (since the authors anticipate that, even under the ACA, 
shareholders will continue to select the majority of directors), 
employees having the next-highest level of representation, and the other 
five stakeholder groups seeing lesser representation. If equal 
representation of the seven stakeholder groups is desired, then it may be 
necessary to provide that directors are appointed by representatives of 
each of the groups—environment-selected directors, community-
selected directors, customer-selected directors, etc. 
 
B. Providing a Forum for Argument 
 
The existence of the ACA simulation platform provides two substantial 
benefits by its nature as an open-source software project. First, the 
nature of such a computational system provides empirical repeatability 
that is often lacking in legal scholarship. Much legal scholarship relies 
on precedent and theoretical arguments; empirical legal studies is a 
relatively young field. Second, being open source (with all code 





140 We note that employees may sometimes also be shareholders. 
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how the software works. This allows for arguments of a different nature 
than those typically possible in legal scholarship. Being able to offer up 
the system so that others might revise it, extend it, or contest it creates 
the possibility of engaging with policy in an empirical, collaborative 
way and provides a form of evidence that is often lacking in legal 
scholarship and policy discourse. While data do not necessarily provide 
conclusive answers to many types of questions, data nevertheless are 
frequently useful in supporting certain kinds of decision-making. 
 
 
IX.  Conclusions 
 
This article presents research that explores potential effects of Delaware 
corporate law and the Accountable Capitalism Act on the behavior of 
corporate directors. Data were gathered via an interactive, computer-
based simulation, deployed to several hundred human participants 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online crowdsourcing platform. 
Results from this study provide evidence that the Accountable 
Capitalism Act may impact director behavior and thereby lead to 
changes in the behavior of corporations.  
 
Specifically, the study found that participants assigned to act as 
shareholder-selected directors instructed via Delaware corporate law 
favor shareholders more than those instructed via the Accountable 
Capitalism Act, particularly in decisions where the alternative is an 
option that is equally beneficial to several stakeholder groups. We used 
these results to assemble “virtual boards of directors” and found that 
both facets of the Accountable Capitalism Act that we studied—the 
requirement for directors to consider the effects of corporate actions on 
various stakeholder groups and the requirement of employee 
representation on corporate boards—had tangible implications for 
corporate behavior. That is, the directions participants were given 
regarding the actions they were supposed to take as well as the 
information about which stakeholder group had selected them both 
affected their behavior. 
 
This study therefore provides support for the proposition that the 
Accountable Capitalism Act would likely lead to the outcomes for 
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which it is designed, and—importantly—that both aspects we studied 
are necessary for those outcomes. 
 
This study contributes concrete evidence regarding the relative effects 
of Delaware corporate law and the Accountable Capitalism Act and 
provides a demonstration of the potential value of participatory 
simulation in empirical legal studies. If the goal of the law is to achieve 
certain societal outcomes, then participatory simulation may be a useful 
tool in the toolbox of approaches by which effective laws may be 
developed and evaluated. 
